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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NURSES AND LEGAL PROBLEMS
I. RELATION TO THE STATE AND PUBLIC.
It is only comparatively recently that legislation has
been adopted in reference to the profession of nursing.
Although practical nursing had its origin in Germany in
1836 and was first brought to public attention by Florence
Nightingale during the Crimean War, it has been since
1880 that nursing has had its greatest development, aided
primarily by the advances in bacteriology, antisepsis, and
asepsis.'
Today eighteen thousand nurses graduate annually from the various approved training schools throughout America.

2

With the growing importance of nursing it is the aim
of this paper, in brief, to point out the statutes affecting
nursing, particularly in Pennsylvania, as well as the cases
dealing with the relation of the nurse to the hospital, to
the physician, and to the patient.
Today states generally have statutes creating boards
of nurse examiners with which properly accredited
nurses may register after passing an examination. Pennsylvania's basic law is the Act of May 1, 1909, 3 having as its
preamble the following:
"Whereas, The safety of the public is endangered
by insufficiently trained and incompetent nurses, in the
absence of a law for the registration of those possessing the proper qualifications ;"'

The purpose of such a statute is to protect the general
public against incompetent and unskilled nurses, and it is
with this in mind that our courts interpret such acts.' Indirectly such statutes limit the number of prospective
nurses, thus preventing over-crowding in the nursing pro1

Encyc. Brit. (14th ed.), Vol. 16, pp. 43-45.

2Ibid.

3P. L. 321.
'Ibid.
5Opinion of Dep. Att'y Gen't Keller in Re Practicing Nurses, 45
Pa. C. C. 393, 396 (1916).
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fession which today possesses approximately two hundred
thousand members.
In recognition of the importance of nursing certain
statutes have been passed in Pennsylvania. The basic act
of 19096 provided for the registration of nurses; the setting
up of a Board of Examiners consisting of five members; the
giving to the Board the power to give annual examinations
and issue certificates of registration; the qualifications for
registration being placed at a minimum of two years training, both practical and theoretical, in surgical and medical
nursing, coupled with the provision that the nurse must
be twenty-one years of age; and making it a penal offense
to profess to be a registered nurse or to use the abbreviation R.N. unlawfully. The statute also gave the Board
power to revoke unanimously the certificate of any nurse.
There have been several amendments to the basic act,
but in the main the provisions stand as above stated.7
II.

RELATION TO THE HOSPITAL.

In discussing the question of the nurse and her relation to the hospital it is necessary to divide this problem
into two parts: First, the nurse and her relation to the
public hospital; and, second, the nurse and her relation to
the so-called private hospital or sanitarium.
The relation of the nurse to the public hospital is
essentially not that of a servant. Mr. Justice Cardozo has
defined the relation of the nurse to the public hospital in
the following language:
"It is true * * * * of nurses as of physicians, that, in
treating and caring for a patient, they are not acting
3P. L. 321, supra.

7Amended June 20, 1919, P. L. 545, so as to have the Board of
Examiners consist of three physicians, two of whom are officially
connected with public hospitals where nurses' training schools are
maintained, and the other two members to be registered nurses of
five years experience. This statute also made provisions for the
eligibility for Pennsylvania certificates of nurses from other states by
application without examination, the regular registration fee being
Ten Dollars. Amended also by the Act of June 8, 1923; P. L. 498,
and the Act of May 13, 1927, P. L. 988.
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as servants of the hospital. The superintendent is a
servant of the hospital; the assistant superintendents,
the orderlies, and the other members of the administrative staff are servants of the hospital. But
nurses are employed to carry out the orders of the
physicians, to whose authority they are subject. The
ospital undertakes to procure for the patient the services of a nurse. It does not undertake, through the
agency of the nurses, to render those services itself. The
reported cases make no distinction in that respect between the position of a nurse and that of a physician
(Powers v. Mass. Hospital,109 Fed. 194, 44 C. C. A. 122,
65 L. R. A. 372, 1901; Ward v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 78
App. Div. 317, 79 N. Y. Supp. 1004, 1903; Hillyer v. St.
Bartholomew's Hospital, 1909, 2 K. B. 820); and none is
justified in principle. If there are duties performed by
nurses foreign to their duties in carrying out the
physician's orders, and having relation to the administrative conduct of the hospital, the fact is not established by the record, nor was it in the discharge of
such duties that the defendant's nurses were then
serving. The acts of preparation immediately preceding the operation are necessary to its successful performance, and are really part of the operation itself.
They are not different in that respect from the administration of ether. Whatever the nurse does in
those preliminary stages, is done not as the servant of
the hospital, but in the course of treatment of the
patient, as the delegate of the surgeon to whose orders
she is subject. The hospital is not chargeable with her
knowledge that the operation is improper any more
than with the surgeons. '"8
Most hospitals are public hospitals, in that they are
charitable organizations organized for no private gain and
maintained for the proper care and medical treatment of
the sick, and this is true even though such a hospital admits patients for pay to its confines. As such, the hospitals are not liable in damages to their patients, whether
charity or pay, for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the nurses or physicians or servants of the hospital. 9
'Schloendorff v. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 at 94, 95
(1914).
9Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910);
Paterlini v. Hospital Ass'n, 247 Fed. 639 (3rd Circuit-1918).
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A leading case is that of Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis,0
in which case a nurse in a Philadelphia hospital negligently
placed two hot water bottles in the bed of a patient but
recently operated upon and still under the influence of
ether, so that the hot water escaped from one of the bottles
and scalded the patient severely. The hospital was sued by
the patient, but the court refused to allow recovery in view
of the rule of law that public hospitals are not liable to
their patients for personal injuries caused by the negligence
of nurses.
There are certain purely administrative functions in
the doing of which the nurse may be said to be the servant
of the public hospital, but usually a nurse is not acting as
the servant of the hospital.
On the other hand, taking the cases dealing with
nurses in hospitals maintained for purely private profit or
sanitariums it is noted that different rules of law are applied. Nurses and doctors in such hospitals and sanitariums have been held to be and are servants of the owner
of the institution. Such being the case, then it follows
that the owner is responsible for the negligent and careless acts of the nurses and doctors. The absence of a
nurse from the room of a delirious patient has been held
to amount to negligence on the part of a private hospital."
The owner of such a hospital has been held liable for the
careless use of a hot water bag by a nurse resulting in injuries to a patient.1 2 Proprietors of sanitariums have been
held responsible for the failure of physicians on their staffs
to use due care in operations and care of its patients. s
Therefore, it is well settled that the owner of a private
hospital or sanitarium, which is operated for profit and is
not a duly organized charitable institution, is liable in damages for injuries to patients caused by the negligence of
10227

Pa. 254, 75 At. 1087 (1910).
"Wetzel v. Hospital, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N. W. 582 (1914); Group
v, Sanitarium, 147 Ill. App. 7 (1909).
1222 A. L. R. 341 at 349, annotation b. Cf. Gable v. Sisters of St.
Francis, supra.
laIbid.
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the nurses, staff physicians, or other employees, for a
private hospital owes to its patients the duty to use reasonable care for their safety and reasonable skill and diligence in nursing and caring for them. 14
III.

RELATION TO THE PHYSICIAN.

It has been observed that a nurse is under the direct
control of the physician rather than that of the hospital,
except in those few circumstances where she is performing
purely administrative duties for the hospital. This rule is
true of nurses in public hospitals. 5 Nurses in privately
owned hospitals or sanitariums are servants of the owners
of such institutions. 6 A nurse has no authority to practice
medicine, nor can she undertake the treatment and cure of
disease."
"There are many things that a nurse may lawfully do
in the field of medicine and surgery, when acting under
the direction and supervision of a physician or surgeon,
which she cannot do legally of her own initiative or independent of a physician's orders or instructions. For example, she may administer drugs of all types, narcotics, and
stimulants; give hypodermic injections of morphia, hypodermoclysis, and enemas; take the temperature and pulse
of the patient and give prescribed remedies in case of collapse or undue excitement; give baths and massages; place
dressings and bandages and apply salves; prepare saline
solutions to be injected into the blood vessels under certain conditions and many other duties peculiarly within
the ministrations of a nurse in the sick room."1 8 Under
the orders and directions of a physician a nurse may administer an anesthetic. 19
"Ibid. II a, and 343 b.
' 5 Supra, notes 8 & 9.
"Supra, note 12.
17Act of May 1, 1909, P. L. 321, sec. 9.
' 8Qpinion of Dep. Att'y Gen'l Keller in Re Practicing Nurses,
45 Pa. C. C. 393, 395 (1916).
19Ibid.
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Is the relationship of the physician and nurse that of
master and servant? It has been so held in a case where a
hospital nurse, although not in the regular employ of an
operating surgeon, was under his special supervision and
control during the operation.20 In this case, Aderhold v.
Bishop,21 the surgeon was held liable, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, for the nurse's negligence.
In the Pennsylvania case of Davis v. Kerr,22 a surgeon
was held liable for the negligence of a nurse under his supervision and control, but whether this was predicated on
the doctrine of respondeat superior is not disclosed by the
decision. The liability of a physician for the negligence of
a nurse under his control may arise not only by following
the master and servant theory, but also by the doctrine
called relational duties. 23 Under such a doctrine certain
duties arise between a physician and his patient merely
because of the relationship itself. Applying this by analogy to the physician-nurse relationship, might not certain
duties be said to arise automatically from such a relationship, regardless of whether the master-servant rule is
adopted or not?
To call the nurse the servant of the physician disregards the fact that often it is the patient who hires the
nurse and who has the right to discharge the nurse. Yet
this feature should not be and is not controlling, for as
stated above 2- it has been held by at least one court that
the relation of physician and nurse is that of master and
servant.
20
Aderhold
21

v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923).
Ibid. In Baker v. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co., 243 Ill. 482, 90 N.
E. 1057, 26 L. R A. (N. S.) 1058, 134 Am. St. Rep. 382 (1910), it is
said: "The maxim of respondeat superior is founded on the principle that he who expects to derive advantage from an act which is
done by another for him must answer for any injury" which a third
person "may sustain from it."
22239 Pa. 351, 86 AtI. 1007 (1913).
zsBowman: Elementary Law, (1929) pp. 300, 301.
24Supra, note 21.
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IV. RELATION TO THE PATIENT.
Assuming that the holding that the relation of the
physician and nurse is that of master and servant, 5 it
does not follow that because the doctor or master is personally liable for the negligence of the nurse or servant
that the nurse it not also personally liable. The contrary
is the law, and it is a general rule that a servant is per-

sonally liable for injuries resulting from his negligence2 6
The degree of care and skill required of physicians and
surgeons is not the highest possible, but only that which
is reasonable and ordinary, and in determining the standard of care and skill which the law requires, the state of
2
scientific knowledge at the time must be considered. T
Nurses should be liable to no higher degree of care than
physicians or surgeons. The same standard of care would
seem to be applicable relative to the duties of a nurse toward the patient, as those of a physician toward the
patient.
NICHOLAS UNKOVIC.

NECESSARY TESTAMENTARY PROVISION
AFTER-BORN CHILDREN

FOR

1
Section 21 of the Wills Act as amended, provides as
follows "When any person, male or female, shall make a
last will and testament, and afterward shall marry, or shall
have a child or children, either by birth or by adoption, not
provided for in such will, and shall die leaving a surviving
spouse and such child or children, or either a surviving
spouse or such child or children, although such child or
children be born after the death of their father, every such
25

Supra, note 21.
Labatt's Master & Servant sec. 2580 et. seq.
2TWohlert v. Seibert, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 213 (1903); Howard v.
Grover, 28 Me. 97, 48 Am. Dec. 478 (1848); 29 Yale L. J. 684, 5; Barnard v. Schell, 85 Pa. Super. Ct. 329 (1924); 48 C. J. 1113.
267

11921, P. L. 937, Sec. 1.

